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“[W]arranties are favored in law, being a part of a man’s assurance.”1 
ABSTRACT 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) recognizes both 
express warranties and implied warranties of quality in the sale of goods.  
Within specific limits, the UCC permits sellers to exclude or modify implied 
warranties.  When it comes to disclaiming express warranties, however, the 
UCC is not so explicit.  However, sellers of goods sometimes inquire about the 
possibility of doing so and whether such disclaimers are enforceable.  This 
essay attempts to answer these questions. 
The principle of freedom of contract posits that parties are free to reach 
                                                
*Kurt M. Saunders is Professor of Business Law, California State University, Northridge.  
The author wishes to thank Leonard Rymsza for his contribution to an early draft of this essay.  
The inspiration for this research was the countless number of times I have been asked this question 
by my students.  After answering it with more or less certainty over the years, I decided to 
investigate it in-depth for the sake of my own curiosity.   
1 EDWARD COKE & JOHN HENRY THOMAS, A SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE’S 
FIRST INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, ON THE PLAN OF SIR MATTHEW HALE’S ANALYSIS; 
WITH THE ANNOTATIONS OF MR. HARGRAVE, LORD CHIEF JUSTICE HALE, AND LORD 
CHANCELLOR NOTTINGHAM; AND A NEW SERIES OF NOTES AND REFERENCES TO THE PRESENT 
TIME – PRIMARY SOURCE EDITIONS 219–20 (Nabu Press 2013) (1818). 
60                      BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW          Vol. IX:I 
 
contracts on mutually agreed terms.2  Most contracts for the sale of goods 
include various warranties of quality.  A warranty is a guarantee or promise by 
the seller to the buyer that specific facts about the goods are true.3  Warranties 
tend to become an issue of contention when the buyer becomes dissatisfied 
with the goods after purchase.  Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code4 
(UCC) recognizes both express warranties and implied warranties.  Within 
limits, the UCC permits sellers to exclude or modify implied warranties on the 
goods they sell.  Although the implied warranties of merchantability5 and 
fitness for a particular purpose6 are imposed by operation of law, the UCC 
provides specific requirements by which the seller can disclaim either of these 
warranties.7   
On occasion, a seller of goods will inquire about the possibility of 
disclaiming an express warranty.  Unlike implied warranties, an express 
warranty is the result of a negotiated exchange between the buyer and seller.8  
When it comes to disclaiming express warranties, however, the UCC is not so 
explicit.9  Can a seller ever disclaim an express warranty?  This essay attempts 
to answer this question.  In doing so, I first review how an express warranty 
arises under Article 2 of the UCC.  Next, I consider whether the UCC allows 
for exclusions of express warranties and, if so, how this might be 
accomplished.  Finally, I assess the extent to which an express warranty 
disclaimer would be enforceable.  
                                                
2 Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598 
(1969). 
3 See JOHN E. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 101(A) (5th ed. 2011). 
4 U.C.C. §§ 2-313–2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977).   
5 Id. § 2-314.  In its most commonly understood form, an implied warranty of merchantability 
requires that goods be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”  Id. § 2-
314(2)(c). 
6 Id. §2-315.  An implied warranty of fitness arises where the seller has reason to know of the 
consumer’s specific purpose for which the goods are required and the consumer is relying on the 
seller’s skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing goods for that purpose.  Id. § 2-315. 
7 Id. § 2-316.  Any written warranty disclaimer must be conspicuous.  Id. § 2-316(2).  The 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose must be disclaimed in writing, while a 
disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must mention the term “merchantability.”  
Id.  Similarly, warranties may be disclaimed by “language which in common understanding calls 
the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied 
warranty.”  Id. § 2-316(3)(a).  Additionally, warranties will be effectively disclaimed when the 
consumer examines, or is provided with an opportunity to examine the goods, or “by course of 
dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.” Id. §§ 2-316(3)(b)–2-136(3)(c). 
8 See Medical City Dallas, Ltd. v. Carlisle Corp., 251 S.W.3d 55, 63 (Tex. 2008). 
9 Before the enactment of the UCC, the courts routinely allowed for the disclaimer of express 
warranties on the basis of freedom of contract.  See Note, Implied and Express Warranties and 
Disclaimers Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 38 IND. L.J. 648, 664 (1963). 
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I.  CREATION OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES 
A seller may create an express warranty by an affirmative statement of 
fact or promise regarding the goods being sold,10 through a description of the 
goods,11 or by providing to the buyer a sample or model of the goods.12  An 
express warranty will arise from any of these, provided it becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain of the contract, and the goods must conform to the 
description, promise, or model or sample.13  By making a promise or statement 
of fact about the goods, or providing a description of the goods that are part of 
the basis of the bargain of the contract, the seller creates an express warranty 
that the goods will conform to the description.14  Similarly, the seller is 
providing the buyer with a sample or model that becomes part of the basis of 
the bargain between the parties.  This creates an express warranty that “the 
whole of the goods” will conform to the sample or model.15   
Any of these become part of the basis of the bargain when the buyer 
relies on the description, promise, or model or sample in making his or her 
decision to purchase the goods.  However, a consumer need not prove reliance 
since all representations of quality by the seller become part of the basis of the 
bargain unless “good reason is shown to the contrary.”16  Thus, the buyer’s 
awareness of the seller’s representations at the time of their agreement is 
sufficient to meet this requirement.17  In addition, the seller need not have a 
specific intent to make a warranty or use words like “warrant” or “guarantee” 
to create a warranty.18  However, statements by the seller relating to the value 
or opinion of the goods will not create an express warranty.19  It is important to 
differentiate statements of fact from statements of value or opinion.  A 
statement like “these are the best microprocessors around” or “these tires are a 
great deal” are considered puffery or sales talk and do not create express 
                                                
10 U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a). 
11 Id. § 2-313(1)(b). 
12 Id. § 2-313(1)(c). 
13 Id. § 2-313(1)(a). 
14 Id. § 2-313(1)(b). 
15 Id. § 2-313(1)(c). 
16 Id. § 2-313 cmt. 8.  In essence, there is a rebuttable presumption that the description, 
promise, or sample or model is part of the basis of the bargain between the parties. 
17 Id. cmt. 3; see, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'd in 
part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336 (Va. 1992); England 
v. Leithoff, 323 N.W.2d 98 (Neb. 1982). 
18 U.C.C. § 2-313(2).  Likewise, it is not necessary for the seller to have any particular 
experience in selling the goods at issue.  See Ewers v. Eisenzopf, 276 N.W.2d 802 (Wis. 1979).  
19 U.C.C. § 2-313(2). 
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warranties.20 
As can be seen, an express warranty goes to the essence of what the 
seller has agreed to sell.21  An express warranty may be oral or written.22  
Unlike implied warranties, which arise automatically and require no particular 
statement or action by the seller,23 express warranties result from any 
affirmative statement or action on the part of the seller relating to the quality or 
characteristics of the goods.   
II.  DISCLAIMERS OF EXPRESS WARRANTIES 
In broad terms, the UCC provides that endeavors to disclaim warranties 
should be construed reasonably and enforced unless doing so would be 
unreasonable under the circumstances.24  To allow a seller to disclaim an 
express warranty that the seller freely promised would appear to be illogical.  
As the comment to section 2-313 states: “‘Express warranties rest on 
‘dickered’ aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of 
that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic 
dickered terms.”25  The conclusion that an express warranty, once made, cannot 
be disclaimed would appear to be indisputable.26 
Nevertheless, the UCC permits a seller to disclaim an express warranty 
through a confusing provision.  Section 2-316 provides that wherever 
reasonable, an express warranty and a disclaimer of any express warranty are 
to be construed as consistent with each other.27  However, subject to the 
provisions of the UCC on parol or extrinsic evidence,28 a disclaimer of an 
express warranty “is inoperative to the extent that such construction is 
                                                
20 See, e.g., Web Press Serv. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 525 A.2d 57 (Conn. 1987); 
Guess v. Lorenz, 612 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
21 See UCC § 2-313 cmt. 4 (“[T]he whole purpose of the law of warranty is to determine what 
it is that the seller has in essence agreed to sell.”). 
22 See id. § 2-202.  If the express warranty is oral, it is possible that parol evidence rule issues 
may arise.  If the parties intend the written purchase agreement to be a final expression of their 
agreement (i.e., intend the agreement to be fully integrated), then the parol evidence rule would 
prohibit the introduction of evidence of an oral express agreement.  See Betaco, Inc. v. Cessna 
Aircraft Co., 103 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1996). 
23 See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 1 (implied warranties “rest so clearly on a common factual 
situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action is necessary to evidence them 
and they will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated”). 
24 See U.C.C. § 2-316(1). 
25 Id. § 2-313 cmt. 1. 
26 See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 425 (5th ed. 
2000); MURRAY, supra note 3, at § 101(E)(1). 
27 See U.C.C. § 2-316.  
28 Id. § 2-202. 
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unreasonable.”29  Section 2-316 is designed to protect both the buyer and the 
seller.30  To better understand how both the buyer and the seller are protected, 
an analysis of four specific fact situations will be helpful. 
The first situation involves an express warranty stated in the written 
agreement that also contains a general disclaimer, such as “seller disclaims all 
warranties” or “seller makes no warranties, either express or implied, with 
respect to these goods.”  In this instance, the general disclaimer is inoperative.  
This result relies on a general rule of contract construction that when there is a 
conflict between specific and general provisions in the written contract, the 
specific provisions prevail.31  Giving effect to the general written disclaimer 
provision over the specific express written warranty is unreasonable and 
therefore the general disclaimer is inoperative.32 
The second situation involves an express warranty stated in the written 
agreement that also contains a specific disclaimer.33  In this instance, the 
general rule of contract construction whereby a specific provision of the 
agreement prevails over a general provision does not apply because there is a 
head-to-head meeting of two specific provisions.  However, the inclusion in the 
written agreement of an express warranty and a specific disclaimer cannot be 
construed as reasonably consistent with one another.  In this case, section 2-
316(1) explicitly states “negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that 
such construction is unreasonable.”34  The result in both the first and second 
                                                
29 Id. § 2-316(1) (emphasis added). 
30 See id. § 2-316 cmts. 1–2. 
31 See id. § 2-316(1); see also id. § 2-316 cmt. 1.  Comment 4 to section 2-313 further 
provides: “[A] contract is normally a contract for a sale of something describable and described.  A 
clause generally disclaiming ‘all warranties, express or implied’ cannot reduce the seller’s 
obligation with respect to such description and therefore cannot be given literal effect under 
Section 2-316.”  Id. § 2-313 cmt. 4; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203(c) 
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).  The provisions of section 2-202 of the Uniform Commercial Code relating 
to parol or extrinsic evidence do not apply given that both the express warranty and the disclaimer 
of the express warranty are included in the contract in writing.  See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2014). 
32 See U.C.C. § 2-316(1); see also Hayes v. Bering Sea Reindeer Prods., 983 P.2d 1280, 1286 
(Alaska 1999) (“A seller cannot negate express warranties through generalized disclaimers.”); 
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. 1978).  But see Broomfield v. 
Parker, No. 12-06-00208-CV, 2007 WL 677819, at *1, *3 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2007) (“as is” 
clause in written contract served to disclaim implied and express warranties). 
33 For instance, the contract represents that “this fabric is made of 100% cotton” or “seller 
warrants that all components are new,” but includes a disclaimer stating “seller disclaims any 
warranty that the fabric contains or is made of cotton” or “seller does not warrant that any 
component is new.” 
34 U.C.C. § 2-316(1).  This approach focuses on the buyer’s expectations.  If a reasonable 
buyer would not expect or be surprised by the disclaimer, then it should not be enforceable.  See 
Robert A. Hillman, U.C.C. Article 2 Express Warranties and Disclaimers in the Twenty-First 
Century, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 167, 171 (2009). 
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situations is the same in that the disclaimer is inoperative.35 
The third situation involves an express warranty not appearing in a 
written agreement that contains a specific disclaimer of all oral express 
warranties.36  Generally, in a situation such as this, the express warranty is 
oral.37  In this instance, the seller’s specific disclaimer will prevail.  The seller 
will be able to rely upon the parol evidence rule contained in section 2-202 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, which reads, in pertinent part: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree 
or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein 
may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement . . . .38  
The parol evidence rule would prevent the buyer from proving and 
relying on the alleged oral express warranty.39  Thus, the oral express warranty 
would be inconsistent with the disclaimer in a written agreement intended by 
the parties as the final expression of their written agreement.  Finally, the last 
situation involves an express warranty not appearing in a written agreement 
that contains a general disclaimer of all oral express warranties.  As in the third 
situation, the seller’s specific disclaimer will prevail.  Again, the seller will be 
able to rely upon the UCC’s parol evidence rule to prevent the buyer from 
                                                
35 See Husky Spray Serv., Inc. v. Patzer, 471 N.W.2d 146, 152 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a 
disclaimer of which buyer was unaware cannot exclude explicitly bargained-for express warranty).  
But see Hayes, 983 P.2d at 1286, where the court gave effect to a specific disclaimer of an express 
warranty because it was conspicuous in a contract between parties with equal bargaining power and 
the buyer had ample opportunity to inspect the goods before purchase.  See St. Croix Printing 
Equip., Inc. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 428 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
36 For example, the seller orally states or promises: “the glass is shatterproof” or “this product 
contains no artificial ingredients,” and the written agreement includes a disclaimer such as: “seller 
makes no warranties, either express or implied” or “seller disclaims any oral representations about 
the ingredients used in this product.” 
37 See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 5.  Comment 5 states that  
[a] description need not be by words.  Technical specifications, blueprints 
and the like can afford more exact description than mere language and if 
made part of the basis of the bargain goods must conform to them.  Past 
deliveries may set the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by 
course of dealing.   
Id. 
38 However, in order to rely on the rule the seller must establish that the terms of the 
agreement between the parties are “set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement . . . .”  Id. § 2-202. 
39 See id. § 2-316 cmt. 2 (“The seller is protected under this Article against false allegations 
of oral warranties by its provisions on parol and extrinsic evidence . . . .”). 
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introducing parol or extrinsic evidence of any oral express warranties.40 
This rationale served as the basis of the court’s holding in Boud v. 
SDNCO, Inc.,41 which involved a contract to purchase a luxury yacht.  The 
contract included a disclaimer of any express warranty that might have been 
created during the negotiation process.42  When the buyer discovered numerous 
mechanical problems with the yacht, he sued to rescind the sale and argued that 
the disclaimer was not binding.43  The court, however, ruled that he could not 
avoid the effect of the parol evidence rule or claim that the parties agreed to 
any terms other than those in the written contract.44  As such, any express 
warranties were disclaimed. 
Although the language in section 2-316(1) is cumbersome and on initial 
reading appears illogical, a careful analysis of the section provides some 
insight into the attempt on the part of the drafters to provide some protection to 
both the buyer and the seller.  If an express warranty is contained in the written 
agreement, the buyer is provided with maximum protection from the effect of a 
disclaimer.  However, if the express warranty is not contained in the written 
agreement, the seller is able to obtain maximum protection by complying with 
the parol evidence provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.45  Even so, it is 
probable that a disclaimer of an express warranty that is not conspicuous would 
be regarded as unenforceable.46 
III.  EFFECTIVENESS OF EXPRESS WARRANTY DISCLAIMERS 
Although it is possible in limited circumstances to disclaim an express 
warranty, the effect of such disclaimers may be circumscribed.  In Mobile 
Housing, Inc. v. Stone,47 for instance, the buyers sought to rescind a contract 
for the sale to them of a mobile home that did not conform to the purchase 
agreement or the model shown and demonstrated to them.48  The seller relied 
on a disclaimer in the contract and the parol evidence rule.  However, the court 
                                                
40 See id. 
41 Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 54 P.3d 1131 (Utah 2002). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 1135; see also Miller v. Hubbard-Wray Co., 630 P.2d 880 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
45 However, in order to rely on the rule the seller must establish that the terms of the 
agreement between the parties are “set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement . . . .”  Id. (quoting Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72.2020 (West)). 
46 See Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 416 A.2d 394 (N.J. 1980).  It is also probable that 
such a provision will be strictly construed against the seller.  See Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic 
Tool Co., 199 Cal. Rptr. 789 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
47 Mobile Hous., Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973). 
48 Id. at 611–13. 
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examined the language of the parol evidence rule and concluded that both 
parties must intend for the writing to be a “final expression of their 
agreement.”49  According to the court, since the buyers intended that the 
mobile home would conform to the model and the description given by the 
seller, it could not be seriously contended that the written contract was 
intended to be the final expression of the parties’ agreement.50 
In addition, there are further avenues that may afford defenses to the 
enforcement of express warranty disclaimers.  This section explores whether a 
party against whom a disclaimer would be enforced can assert arguments based 
on fraud and misrepresentation, unconscionability, or state unfair trade 
practices and consumer protection statutes to negate the enforceability of the 
disclaimer. 
A. Fraud and Misrepresentation 
Where a seller has made oral statements or promises of fact about the 
goods sufficient to create an express warranty and later disclaimed them in the 
written contract, the buyer may be able to void the contract on the basis of 
fraud and misrepresentation if he relied on those statements or promises.  A 
misrepresentation is an untrue statement of fact rather than an opinion.51  The 
party seeking to avoid the contract must also prove that he actually and 
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation of fact in deciding to enter into the 
contract.52  Reliance is not justifiable if the assertion is obviously false.53  The 
contract will be voidable regardless of whether the misrepresentation was 
fraudulent because it was intentionally deceptive, or innocent and not made 
with knowledge of its falsity or intent to deceive.54  In addition to the remedy 
of avoidance, the party may have a claim for damages caused by the 
misrepresentation.55 
A seller who has made representations creating an express warranty and 
                                                
49 U.C.C. § 2-202. 
50 Stone, 490 S.W.2d at 615; accord Miller, 630 P.2d 880. 
51 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  The 
nondisclosure or concealment of a material fact is considered to be the equivalent of an affirmative 
misrepresentation.  Id. § 161.  The distinction between statements of fact versus opinion is not 
always clear, but should be based on whether the seller has sufficient knowledge to make an 
assertion rather than express a mere belief.  See MURRAY, supra note 3, at § 96[2]. 
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (alterations in 
original). 
53 Id. § 164 cmt. d. 
54 See id. 
55 Id. § 376.  No election of remedies is required in contracts for the sale of goods.  See 
U.C.C. § 2-271.  
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who seeks to disclaim the warranty is likely to rely on the parol evidence rule 
to exclude such representations as contradicting the language of the written 
contract.56  However, many courts have recognized a fraud exception to the 
parol evidence rule.57  If the buyer can establish that the seller did not intend to 
abide by an oral express warranty when it was made, then parol evidence of 
prior oral promises or representations will be admissible to prove fraud.58  For 
example, in George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co.,59 the 
seller of an airplane represented that it was in perfect condition and capable of 
transporting cargo of 40,000 pounds a distance of 2,700 miles.  The written 
contract contained a disclaimer.  When these statements proved to be false, the 
buyer sued for damages and argued that the seller had made fraudulent 
representations of material facts.60  The court held that parol evidence was 
admissible to prove fraud in the inducement of the contract “even though the 
written contract contains covenants waiving warranties or disclaiming or 
limiting liabilities.”61 
B. Unconscionability 
The doctrine of unconscionability enables courts to refuse to enforce 
                                                
56 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see also 
U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N, amended 2001). 
57 See Associated Hardware Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 
1965) (explaining that the parol evidence rule does not apply to evidence of prior oral agreements 
when fraud or mistake is averred); Alling v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718, 733–34 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that parol evidence is admissible to show promissory fraud, only 
if "the false promise is either independent of or consistent with the written instrument").  Indeed, 
“UCC § 1-103 states that ‘[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles 
of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to . . . fraud [or] 
misrepresentation . . . shall supplement its provisions.’”  Big Wheel Distrib. Co., 355 F.2d at 119 
(alteration in original) (quoting U.C.C. § 1-103 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1952), 
amended by U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001)). 
58 See George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Va. 
1979) (explaining that an express warranty can be admissible to prove a contract was induced by 
fraud); see also Associated Hardware Supply Co., 355 F.2d at 119 (explaining that oral agreements 
can be admissible to prove fraud). 
59 George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 1979). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 683; accord Fecik v. Capindale, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (C.P. 1971); Renaissance 
Acres, LLC v. Schmidy’s Mach. Co., No. 217-2010-CV-220, 2011 N.H. Super. LEXIS 42, at 10–
11 (July 18, 2011); cf. Universal Drilling Co. v. Camay Drilling Co., 737 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 
1984) (recognizes the parol evidence fraud exception, but finds that it does not apply here since the 
buyer did not rely on the fraudulent representations).  For a further discussion of relationship 
between the law of misrepresentation and express warranty disclaimers, see Elizabeth Cumming, 
Balancing the Buyer’s Right to Recover for Precontractual Misstatements and the Seller’s Ability 
to Disclaim Express Warranties, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1189 (1992). 
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contracts or contract clauses that they find to be unconscionable and to prevent 
oppression and unfair surprise.62  Section 2-302(1) of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which incorporates the doctrine of unconscionability, provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to 
have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable 
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.63 
The analysis of unconscionability is frequently distinguished by form: 
procedural versus substantive unconscionability.  Procedural unconscionability 
is concerned with the process of contract formation and focuses on such factors 
as unequal bargaining power, lack of meaningful choice, pressured situations, 
conspicuousness of contract terms, and the consumer’s level of education, 
experience, or economic status.64  Substantive unconscionability arises when 
the contract is found to contain overly harsh or one-sided terms such as 
excessive price terms, or remedy exclusions or limitations.65  Most courts will 
not void a contract or contract clause unless they find both substantive and 
procedural unconscionability.66 
Unconscionability may be an effective countermeasure against the 
application of express warranty disclaimers because such “disclaimer[s] . . . 
significantly reduce a warranty protection available under the Uniform 
Commercial Code with the potentially harsh consequence[s]” to the 
consumer.67  Moreover, consumers rarely understand the effect of disclaimers 
and are often in no position to bargain to have such provisions removed from 
the purchase agreement.68  As a consequence, express warranty disclaimers 
may be characterized by both substantive and procedural unconscionability. 
For example, the buyers in Eckstein v. Cummins69 sued for damages and 
to rescind a contract for the purchase of an automobile plagued by defects 
                                                
62 U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2014).  The issue of unconscionability presents a question of law 
for the court rather than an issue of fact for the jury.  Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 528 P.2d 
992, 995 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975). 
63 U.C.C. § 2-302(1).  See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1981). 
64 See MURRAY, supra note 3, at § 97(2)(b). 
65 See id. 
66 E.g., Clark v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 706 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); Harris 
v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999). 
67 Kurt M. Saunders, Unconscionability as “Lemon Aid,” 6 PACE L. REV. 195, 202 (1986) 
(discussing warranty disclaimers in the context of defective “lemon” automobiles). 
68 See id. 
69 321 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). 
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incapable of repair.  The contract contained a disclaimer of express and implied 
warranties.70  On appeal, the court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the 
disclaimer was unconscionable.71  As the court explained: 
To place the purchaser of a defective vehicle incapable of repair in the 
anomalous position of having no actionable claim for relief pursuant to the 
strict language of the express warranty and disclaimer therein, because the 
precise nature of the defect cannot be determined and the plaintiff cannot 
identify any defective part, the replacement of which could remedy in defect, 
would be to defeat the very purpose of the warranty which had been given to 
the purchaser.72 
As a caveat, it must be noted that the holding in Eckstein may be an 
exception.  Most courts have been hesitant to apply unconscionability to 
invalidate disclaimers of implied warranties with the exception of cases 
involving personal injuries to consumers.73  It is likely that a number of courts 
would be similarly reluctant to exclude express warranty disclaimers on the 
basis of unconscionability unless the case involved personal injury.74 
C. Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes 
As to consumers, another potential impediment to the enforcement of 
express warranty disclaimers is state deceptive trade practices and consumer 
protection statutes.  Many such statutes are based on the Uniform Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law,75 which proscribes unfairness and 
deception in commercial sales transactions.76  Most of these laws authorize 
private enforcement actions and remedies, and empower the state attorney 
general to adopt rules and regulations and to seek civil penalties for 
violations.77 
                                                
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 904. 
73 See, e.g., Wilke v. Woodhouse Ford, Inc., 774 N.W.2d 370 (Neb. 2009). 
74 For further discussion of unconscionability and disclaimers of warranties, see Michael J. 
Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers, 62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
199 (1985); Richard A. Lord, Some Further Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied 
Warranties, 56 N.D. L. REV. 510, 545–46 (1980). 
75 The Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law was jointly drafted by the 
Federal Trade Commission and the Committee on Suggested State Legislation of the Council of 
State Governments.  See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 1967 A71–
A78 (1967) (text of the statute). 
76 Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-
FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163 (2011). 
77 Id. 
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Other states have adopted the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,78 
the purpose of which is to protect “consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.”79  Section 3(10) of the Act 
defines a deceptive act or practice to arise when a seller indicates “that a 
consumer transaction involves or does not involve a warranty, [or] a disclaimer 
of warranties … if the indication is false[.]”80  This section prohibits 
misrepresentations to a consumer “that a warranty is unconditional . . . .”81  If a 
seller has made representations about the goods, which are not true, or has 
misrepresented the rights, remedies, or obligations of either the consumer or 
the seller, the consumer can rescind the sale or sue for treble damages, plus 
attorney’s fees, regardless of any disclaimers of warranties or parol evidence.82 
Some courts have applied such statutes to hold that warranty disclaimers 
and remedy limitations are unfair or unconscionable practices.  The case of 
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes83 involved a defective and unmerchantable truck that 
had been sold under an express warranty which limited the consumer’s remedy 
to repair or replacement.  The truck could not be adequately repaired within a 
reasonable period of time and the buyers sued.84  On appeal, the court affirmed 
a jury verdict finding that the manufacturer’s refusal to recognize the 
consumer’s right to revoke acceptance and receive a refund was, under such 
circumstances, unlawful under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act.85  
According to the court, “[b]y insisting that its only liability was to repair or 
replace defective parts even when the defects could not be corrected within a 
reasonable time, Ford would use the strict language of the express warranty to 
deprive [the buyers] of the benefits of their purchase.”86 
                                                
78 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623–50-679a (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01–
1345.13 (LexisNexis 1979); 1953 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-11-1 to 13-11-23 (LexisNexis 1985).  
See generally UNIF. CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, § 7A (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1970), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/consumer%20sales%20practices/MCSA71.pdf.   
79 7A U.L.A. § 1(2) (1997). 
80 Id. § 3(b)(10); e.g., Brown v. Lyons, 332 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1974). 
81 7A U.L.A. § 3(b)(10) cmt. (1997).  Such an act or practice is treated as per se deceptive.  
Id. § 3(b) cmt. 
82 See id. § 11. 
83 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 486; see also Dale v. King Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 676 P.2d 744 (Kan. 1984); Evans 
v. Graham Ford, Inc., 442 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981). 
86 575 S.W.2d at 485.  The court added: “Because the truck could not be repaired within a 
reasonable time, Ford acted ‘unconscionably’ when it insisted that [the buyers] had no remedy 
other than to allow Ford and its dealer to continue indefinitely in their efforts to correct the 
problem.”  Id. at 486. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
It is not always the disingenuous seller who desires to disclaim an 
express warranty.  A seller may want to provide a limited written warranty and 
therefore employ a disclaimer to maintain a standard set of terms for all such 
warranties.87  Alternatively, there is the concern that sales agents will make 
unauthorized oral statements or promises creating express warranties that will 
be binding on the seller.88  In either situation, the seller might consider 
including an express warranty disclaimer in the contract as a reasonable 
business practice.  
Although the language of section 2-316(1) is not a model of clarity, it 
appears to prohibit disclaimers of express warranties by denying effect to such 
language when inconsistent with the language of an express warranty in a 
written contract.  On the other hand, it may be easier for sellers to exclude oral 
express warranties by relying on the parol evidence rule and including a merger 
clause which states that the written contract constitutes the complete and final 
agreement between the parties.  In these instances, it is likely that a 
conspicuous disclaimer of an oral express warranty would be regarded as 
enforceable.89   
Nevertheless, in such cases, a disappointed buyer who wishes to avoid 
the effect of an express warranty disclaimer is not without recourse.  He or she 
may find support for negating the effect of the disclaimer in such theories as 
the fraud exception to the parol evidence rule, the doctrine of 
unconscionability, or by way of remedies available in state deceptive trade 
practices and consumer protection statutes. 
                                                
87 This could arise in a sale involving the sale of a consumer product pursuant to a written 
warranty and governed by the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312. 
88 In such circumstances, the principal would be bound by the express warranty on the basis 
of the agent’s implied actual authority as inferred from the agent’s express actual authority to make 
representations about the goods to prospective buyers.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW 
OF AGENCY § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
89 This result stands in contrast with how such a disclaimer would be treated under the U.N. 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980), 
reprinted in S. TREATY DOC. No. 9, 98th Cong., (1st Sess. 1993).  Article 35 of the CISG requires 
that the goods conform to certain implied representations that are similar to the express and implied 
warranties of quality recognized by the UCC, “[e]xcept where the parties have agreed otherwise.”  
CISG art. 35(2).  This suggests that sellers are easily able to disclaim express warranties as part of 
the agreement.  However, the enforceability of a disclaimer of an express representation depends 
on whether the buyer was aware of it at the time of contracting, or would have purchased the goods 
had he or she known of the disclaimer.  See Kurt M. Saunders, Contract Formation and 
Performance under the UCC and CISG: A Comparative Case Study, 32 J. LEG. STUD. EDUC. 1, 21, 
39 (2015). 

